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Abstract
This symposium’s title is “Administrative Law in
a Time of Chaos.” The chaos that is characteristic of
today’s rich world countries stems from stresses that
confront national electorates, including socio-economic
immobility, a perceived migratory surge from developing
countries, and a sense that the democratic process is
rigged in favor of elites and minorities against the
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interests of the broader public.1 Concomitants of these
stresses include President Trump’s election as U.S.
President and a dramatic rise in support for extreme
political movements that promise simple solutions to
complex problems, usually by scapegoating the courts,
religious minorities and migrants. These extreme political
movements are, like those of the past, hostile to the
procedural constraints imposed by the rule of law and the
due process obligations imposed upon the government by
administrative law, simply defined as the law of
government. The rule of law and due process in
government administration have to be seen as nonnegotiable and proponents of authoritarianism, including
President Trump’s former chief strategist, Steve Bannon,
who advocate for “deconstruction of the administrative
state,” must be opposed as a matter of principle to the
degree their position is antithetical to pluralism and the
rule of law. 2 However, it is important to differentiate
objections to administrative overreach and a principled
belief in the separation of powers from reflexive
illiberalism. One of the driving reasons for separation of
powers transgressions by the Executive Branch is that the
government branch responsible for drafting legislation
See generally Adam Gopnik, The Yellow Vests and Why
There are So Many Street Protests in France, NEW YORKER
(Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the-yellow-vests-and-why-there-are-so-manystreet-protests-in-france (detailing contemporary and
historical protests in France) [https://perma.cc/E4UGGMHL].
2 Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight
for Deconstruction of the Administrative State, WASHINGTON
POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstructionof-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.268a84960f13
[https://perma.cc/75T4-ZMXL].
1
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and holding administrative agencies to account,
Congress, is overmatched, starved of resources, hyperpolarized and incapable of taking its proper role under
the U.S. Constitution.
I recommend two simple changes. The first is to
statutorily increase the number of representatives from
the current 435 to 1250 with a minimum of three per
state.3 The second is to have Congress change our system
of electing representatives from the current single member
plurality paradigm to a statewide-proportional
representation system with a vote threshold requirement
for representation.4 These changes will enable Congress to
take its proper role in the U.S. Constitutional structure by
providing it with greater resources to better anticipate
and address issues of broader public concern and legislate
and oversee administrative agencies.
Should it do so, the U.S. will, ideally, minimize
the chaos that characterizes today’s political climate and,
over time, engender a more cohesive, capable and less
partisan political culture.

The statutory authorization would be consistent with U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 that provides, in
relevant part, that “the Number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall
have at Least one Representative.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2,
cl.3.
4 Changing to a proportional representation system would be
authorized by U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 4, Clause
1 that provides the “Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
3
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I. Introduction
America in 1929 was a different country. Its
population
was
less
ethnically
and
racially
heterogeneous and, at 122 million, was a fraction of
today’s 329 million.5 The national economy, though
booming, was $105 billion,6 and the federal government
had a modest role both at home and abroad.7
Notwithstanding the fact Congress had historically
increased the number of representatives in proportion to
population throughout American history, President
Hoover signed the Reapportionment Act into law in 1929,
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/[https://perma.cc/852THZWG].
6 See Kimberly Amadeo, US GDP by Year Compared to
Recessions and Events: The Strange Ups and Downs of the
U.S. Economy Since 1929, BALANCE (June 8, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543 [https:
//perma.cc/4UTG-JUCL].
7 The federal workforce remained small, the New Deal Era
had not commenced, federal agencies had modest powers, and
the size of the national defense budget was relatively small.
See generally, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW (2005).
5
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which legislatively capped the number of representatives
at 435.8 In view of the massive growth in population and
government that followed the Great Depression, the New
Deal, World War II, and the Cold War, it is altogether
puzzling that Congress has failed to amend the
Reapportionment Act such that the number of
representatives has remained fixed at 435.9
American elites bemoan the problems of political
polarization in conjunction with the paradoxical problem
of voter apathy, both of which bedevil U.S. politics.
Unfortunately, polarization and apathy are an inherent
concomitant of the U.S.’s reliance on single member
plurality districts. A relic from the early days of
democracy, single member plurality districts have been
replaced by various forms of proportional representation
in other mature democracies.10 The U.S.’s continued
reliance on this model, in conjunction with technological
and other advances in the districting process, has made
Congress an excessively partisan and ineffective
institution.11
Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 2 U.S.C.
§ 2a.
9 Id.
10See
Proportional
Representation,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.brit annica.com/topic/proportional-representation
(listing “Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland” as countries with proportional
representation) [https://perma.cc/TU64-BUPZ].
11 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1929-30 (2018); see also
Ariane de Vogue & Eli Watkins, Supreme Court Allows Most
Disputed Maps in Texas, NC Gerrymandering Cases To Be
Used, CNN POLITICS (June 25, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www.
cnn.com/2018/06/25/politics/supreme-court-north-carolinagerrymandering/index.html (discussing recentgerrymandering decisions) [https://perma.cc/8E4B-JR65].
8
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Recognizing the tension between representative
democracy and administrative expertise in all
industrialized countries, my thesis is that this problem is
exacerbated by an inadequately sized legislature that is
undermined by an outdated and harmful election
framework.
My proposal is twofold: 1) increase the size of the
House of Representatives, from 435 to 1250, with a
minimum of three per state, to create a legislative body
that is of sufficient size to effectively legislate and
oversee a continent-sized superpower; and 2) replace
single member plurality districting with proportional
representation as a means of engendering greater voter
participation and reducing political polarization.
These two changes will, over time, reapportion
the balance of capabilities and powers between the
legislative and executive branches and enable the federal
courts to reevaluate their approach to administrative
agency deference doctrines. It will eventually engender
greater public confidence in the administrative state and
reduce administrative overreach.
The administrative state will always frustrate
separation of powers purists because the Constitution
speaks to all legislative power emanating from Congress
and is silent as to the power of administrative agencies.12
While the broader legal culture focuses on complex
solutions to legitimize the administrative state,13 my

See U.S. CONST., art I, § 1 (providing that “All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.”).
13 What I mean by this is the obvious tension between
democratic accountability and administrative competence in
a technologically advanced country. See STEPHEN G. BREYER
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 84 (7th
12
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thesis is that finding even more innovative means of
legitimizing the administrative state is premature when
much of the purported administrative overreach can be
addressed by fixing obvious defects within the legislative
branch.
II. The U.S. Today: Sclerotic and Ineffective
Government
The chaos that characterizes today’s political
environment is caused by the political culture’s
increasing illiberalism and authoritarianism, including
its hostility towards migrants and recalcitrant attitude
towards America’s leadership role in the international
system.14 This illiberalism is caused by many factors,
including socio-economic and demographic insecurity;
unequal public schools; unaffordable housing, higher
education, and health insurance; and the perception that
democratic institutions are hostage to special interests
and therefore incapable of remediating these concerns.15
ed. 2011) (outlining the tension between democratic
legitimacy and administrative competence and flexibility).
14 See Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Lawlessness and Chaos Go
Hand In Hand, WASH. POST (April 9, 2019),https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/09/lawlesslawl-chaosgo-hand-hand/?noredirect=on (“Chaos is an authoritarian’s
best weapon, allowing him to distract some and to make
others pine for ‘order.’”) [https://perma.cc/UB4D-W24H]; see
also PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC SEES U.S. POWER
DECLINING AS SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT SLIPS:
AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE WORLD 2013 5 (2013) (discussing
American opinions related to declining international respect
for America).
15 See M. Akram Faizer, The Privileges or Immunities Clause:
A Potential Cure for the Trump Phenomenon, 121 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 61, 92 (2016) (discussing the intersection of socio-
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The journalist and public intellectual George Packer has
named this phenomenon the “unwinding” of American
institutions, in that the U.S government is increasingly
incapable of addressing its people’s problems and
concerns.16
In his book Political Order and Political Decay,
the highly regarded political scientist Francis Fukuyama
effectively demonstrates that, while the U.S. dominates
the international system, its electorate is increasingly
illiberal and authoritarian due to institutional decay and
sclerosis.17 Fukuyama’s thesis is that political order in
liberal democracies, such as the United States, rests on
three pillars: namely, political accountability, a strong
effective state, and the rule of law.18 Accountability
economic issues and education issues); Dalibor Rohac et al.,
Drivers of Authoritarian Populism in the United States: A
Primer, CTR. FOR AM. POL. (May 10, 2018, 12:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/
2018/05/10/450552/drivers-authoritarian-populism-unitedstates/ (stating that “the government is seen as unresponsive
to citizens’ concerns and captured by well-organized special
interests” and that, “[a]lthough the U.S. economy has
recovered from the 2008 financial crisis, it is still
characterized by sluggish productivity growth and looming
structural change that threatens jobs at the lower end of the
education and skills ladder.”) [https://perma.cc/4YVWKNCS].
16 George Packer, The Unwinding: An Inner History of the
New America 3–4 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, reprint ed.
2014).
17 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL
DECAY: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE
GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 470-71 (Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, reprint ed. 2015) (discussing the “decay” of American
institutions, including the courts and Congress).
18 See id. at 37 (“I believe that a political system resting on a
balance among state, law, and accountability is both a
practical and a moral necessity for all societies.”).
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involves making rulers responsive to electorates, which
means not only “free and fair multiparty elections,” but,
according to Fukuyama, institutions of accountability
supplemented by a central government that can get
things done with rules and regulations that apply equally
to everyone.19 U.S. political development has gone into
reverse because the state has become weaker, less
efficient, and more corrupt.20 One cause is growing
economic inequality and the geographic concentration of
wealth, which has allowed elites to purchase immense
political power and manipulate the system to further
their own interests.21 Another cause is the permeability
of American political institutions to interest groups,
allowing an array of factions that “are collectively
unrepresentative of the public as a whole” to exercise
disproportionate influence and, in effect, control the
government.22 The result, according to Fukuyama, is a
vicious cycle whereby the government is rendered
incapable or unwilling to deal with national problems in
a way that breeds a cynicism in the electorate that, in
turn, leads to the state being starved of resources and
authority, which furthers the incapacity problem.23
Fukuyama’s thesis is that, although liberal democracy is
the best form of government, it is, absent continuous
reform, susceptible to the institutional decay and
sclerosis.24 This is what currently bedevils the U.S.

Id. at 24-25.
See id. at 486-87.
21 Id. at 465-66.
22 Id. at 35-36.
23 Id. at 503-04.
24 See id. at 487 (“The underlying sources of political decay –
intellectual rigidity and the influence of elite groups – are
generic to democracies as a whole.”).
19
20
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government.25 Examples of such sclerosis include the
hyper-partisan paradigm that characterizes today’s
Washington,26 the systematic inability of Congress to
enact substantive legislation to address public needs,27
and the executive branch’s tendency to compensate for
legislative immobility by means of presidential executive
orders,28 broad agency rulemakings that are
democratically illegitimate and, of course, current
attacks on the administrative state and rule of law.29
Id. at 7, 37.
See Richard H. Pides, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The
Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 273, 277 (2011) (“[M]ost of twentieth century American
politics, while driven by its own conflict, had nothing like the
political-party polarization that arose and has endured
throughout our era.”).
27 See, e.g., Drew Desilver, A Productivity Scorecard for the
115th Congress: More Laws than Before, But Not More
Substance, FACT TANK: NEWS IN THE NUMBERS (Jan. 25,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/25/aproductivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress/ (providing a brief
historical look at recent trends in substantive lawmaking)
[https://perma.cc/AT7V-5SEC].
28 See, e.g., Edward G. Carmines & Matthew Fowler, The
Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased
Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have
Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential Power, 24 IND.
J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 369, 387–88 (2017) (“These executive
orders [related to stem cells] have expanded the power of the
presidency by unilaterally implementing policy on a
controversial issue without the participation of Congress.
With Congress failing to take decisive action on this issue,
recent presidents have used executive authority to further
their policy preferences.”).
29 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential
Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (“As rulemaking
surged in the 1960s and 1970s and we turned from an age of
statutes to an era of regulation, Presidents quickly recognized
25
26
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How is this related to administrative law in a time
of chaos? Because, the chaos that characterizes today’s
politics is due to broader trends in the U.S economy and
society that destabilize American households in ways the
government cannot address. The increased salience of
controversies surrounding the administrative state in
recent years are a symptom of a far broader problem of
governmental incapacity. The goal for administrative
law scholars should be to propose solutions to the
problems of institutional decay and incapacity. My
proposal is to resuscitate U.S. democracy by increasing
the number of representatives in Congress and changing
the way they are elected.
III. Increase Membership in the House of
Representatives
The U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Clause
3 provides that the “Number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty Thousand . . . .”30 As such,
based on a current population of 329 million, the
Constitution would allow for 10,800 or so
representatives. Although this number would be too
large and unwieldy, the fact that the founders allowed for
such an increase evidences their recognition that the
legislative branch’s size should increase over time with
population growth and development. When Congress
legislatively capped the number of representatives in
1929 via the Reapportionment Act, neither Alaska nor
Hawaii were states entitled to Congressional

that unelected officials were making inherently political
policy judgments . . . . ” (emphasis added)).
30 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

[29]

11

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 1
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 14 | SUMMER 2019 | ISSUE 1

representation,31 the nation’s population was only 121.8
million and the federal government had yet to respond to
the major challenges it has since confronted as the
world’s preeminent nation, namely the Great
Depression, World War II, and the Cold War. The
number of representatives has stayed the same,
notwithstanding further challenges to national cohesion
since the Cold War, including the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks,
the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of
China as an economic and geopolitical competitor, and
the Financial Crisis that followed Lehman Brothers’
collapse in September 2008.
James Madison, writing under the pen name
Publius, outlined that the House of Representatives
should have a high representation rate to properly
manifest public opinion and this explains why Article I
allows for legislative increases in the number of
representatives.32 The highly regarded economist, Bruce
Bartlett, writes as follows:
Article I of the Constitution says that no
congressional district should have more
than 30,000 people. In the first Congress
there were 65 members of the House,
based on an estimate of the population in
1787. In the 1790 census the U.S.
population was 3,929,214, and the size of
the House was increased to 106--meaning
that each congressman represented about
37,000 people. The voting population was
much smaller because women and African
31 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339
(1958); Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4
(1959). Notice that Alaska became a state in 1958 and Hawaii
became a state in 1959.
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James Madison).

[30]
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Americans could not vote. Consequently, a
member of the House knew a high
percentage of voters personally, and they
knew him.
As the nation grew and its population rose,
the number of House members also
increased, although Congress never even
tried to maintain a ratio close to one
member per 30,000 of population. After the
1910 census, the size of the House was
increased from 394 to 435, at which point
each congressman represented 211,000
people.33
To illustrate the scope of the challenge facing
Congress today, the Reapportionment Act was signed
into law when gross domestic product was $105 billion
and the size and scope of the federal government was
negligible.34 Today, that same number of representatives
legislate for, fund, and oversee administrative agencies
in a country with a gross domestic product of over $21
trillion, a population that will soon reach 350 million and
a network of global economic and military alliances that
makes it the leading guarantor of international
Bruce Bartlett, The Ultimate Congressional Reforms,
FORBES (Apr. 30, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
2010/04/29/congress-constitution-voting-opinionscolumnists-bruce-bartlett.html#2363a5247c7a
[https://perma.cc/DQZ9R4 B3].
34 Josh Barro, Lessons from the Decades Long Upward March
of Government Spending, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:45 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbarro/2012/04/16/lessonsfrom-the-decades-long-upward-march-of-governmentspending/#282bf16a2720 [https://perma.cc/2ZCF-YS5M].
33
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prosperity and stability.35 The federal government
currently raises more than $3.4 trillion in revenue and
spends more than $4.1 trillion a year.36 The fact that
Congress has failed to repeal or update the
Reapportionment Act,37 evidences a legislative branch
that has failed to acknowledge both the absolute growth
of government, both in terms of personnel and budgets,
as well the increased complexity of all areas of American
life.
Dramatically increasing the number of
representatives from 435 to 1250, such that each
American would see their effective congressional
representation triple, is a necessary first step towards
35See

Int’l Monetary Fund, Report for Selected Countries and
Subjects (Oct. 2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft
/weo/2018/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=57&pr.y=14&sy=2
017&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c
=111&s=NGDPD%2CPPPGDP%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPPC&
grp=0&a= (for information on the United States GDP)
[https://perma.cc/WT6Y-U8L4]. The world’s second largest
economy, China, has a GDP of approximately $12 trillion at
market exchange rates, and the world’s second largest
developed economy, Japan, has a GDP of approximately $5
trillion. Population Comparison: China, EU, USA, and
Japan, WORLDOMETERS (2014), http://www.worldometers.
info/population/china-eu-usa-japan-comparison/[https://per
ma.cc/6869-4CBE].
36USASpending.gov,
https://www.usaspending.gov/#/
[https:// perma.cc/6F3C-NFT2 ]; SOI Tax Stats – IRS Data
Book,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book
[https://perma.cc/JB93-JXZ3].
37 See Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21, 2
U.S.C. § 2a; see also The Permanent Apportionment Act of
1929,
HIST.,
ART
&
ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/19011950/The-Permanent-Apportionment-Act-of-1929/
(discussing how the 1929 Act capped the number of seats at
435) [https://perma.cc/H43A-B7FG].

[32]
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effectively combating institutional sclerosis and
government incapacity because increasing the number of
available congresspersons for administrative oversight
and the development of legislative expertise, enables
Congress to be better positioned to effectively act in the
public interest.38
Increasing House membership to 1250 would
provide Americans with one representative per 250,000
inhabitants, which more closely approximates the rate
found in other mature democracies.39 For example,
Canada has 338 commons members for a population of
36.3 million, which translates into one Member of
Parliament for every 107,000 inhabitants.40 France has
577 National Assembly deputies for a population of
approximately 66.9 million, or approximately one for
every 116,000 inhabitants,41 and the United Kingdom
has 650 House of Commons members42 for a population
Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress
Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.huffington
post.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressionalfundraising_n_2427291.html (showing how Congress
members are expected to spend the vast majority of their
workdays on fundraising) [https://perma.cc/6L26-3PPM].
39 Bartlett, supra 34.
40 Bill Freeman, Democracy Rising: Politics and Participation
in Canada 163 (2017).
41Bartlett, supra note 34; Demographic Balance Sheet 2018,
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES
ÉCONOMIQUES (Jan. 15, 2019),https://www.insee.fr/en/statist
iques/2382601?sommaire=2382613 [https://perma.cc/778RGU8Q].
42 Electoral Statistics, UK: 2013, OFFICE FOR NAT’L
STATISTICS,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/elec
tions/electoralregistration/bulletins/electoralstatisticsforuk/2
014-05-01 [https://perma.cc/86UL-9Y72].
38
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of 66 million, which translates into one member for every
101,500 inhabitants.43 Western Europe’s
most
economically powerful state,44 Germany, has 709
representatives45 in its lower house, or Bundestag, for a
population of 83 million, which translates into one
representative per 116,600 inhabitants.46
By increasing the size of the House of
Representatives,
U.S.
congresspersons
would
immediately have more manageable districts that would
enable them to better satisfy constituency obligations
and still have time for administrative oversight, public
policy analysis, and legislation.47
See Population Estimates for the UK, England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland: Mid-2017, OFF. FOR NAT’L
STAT. (June 28, 2017), https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulat
ionandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestim
ates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/mid2017#
uk-population-reaches-66-million [https://perma.cc/3MHWR7FG].
44 See Germany Country Profile, BBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17299607 (referring
to Germany as Europe’s “economic giant”).
45 Distribution of Seats in the 19th German Bundestag,
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (Feb. 1, 2019),https://www.bundesta
g.de/en/parliament/plenary/19thbundestag-245692.
46 See Thomas Seythal, Migration Pushes German Population
to Record High of 83 Million, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2019, 3:38
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-populatio
n/migration-pushes-german-population-to-record-high-of-83million-idUSKCN1PJ0PA (“Germany’s population last year
reached a record high of 83 million people due to positive net
migration that easily offset a chronic deficit in births . . . ”)
[https://perma.cc/9D2L-TNZL].
47See DANA MASON & ADAM LIOZ, LOOK WHO’S NOT COMING
TO WASHINGTON: QUALIFIED CANDIDATES SHUT OUT BY BIG
MONEY 46 (2005) (discussing unsuccessful campaigns that
trace that lack of success to Congressional districts that tend
to be so large, congressmen tend to spend inordinate amounts
43
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Indeed, contrary to popular perception,
congresspersons are extremely hardworking individuals
who do their best for their constituents and country.48
Members typically work more than 70 hours per week
when Congress is in session, 59 hours per week when not
in session and sacrifice family time to fulfill work
responsibilities, which include typically spending 40
weekends per year in their home districts.49
Congressmen begin their day at 6 or 7 a.m. and end their
workday at around 8 p.m., with bedtime reading required
to prepare for the next day.50 These work hours are often
increased because congresspersons, who typically have
their families reside in their home districts as opposed to
relocating with them to pricey Washington, D.C., do not
have the normal work-life balance challenges.51 This
dynamic furthers political polarization because
congresspersons who live apart from their families tend
to spend time either with fellow-caucus members when
in Washington or within their own relatively politically
homogeneous constituencies when the House is not in
session.52 Members are also required to juggle conflicting
committee meetings in view of their large and timeconsuming committee obligations.53 They spend only 35%
of their time on legislative and policy work during

of time on campaign related activities, with the recognition
that freshman congressman will have to to spend many
hours each day “cold calling” donors for re-election purposes).
48 Cong. Mgmt. Found. & Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., Life
in Congress: A Member’s Perspective 4-5 (2013).
49 Id. at 4–5.
50 Id. at 11.
51 Id. at 12–13.
52 See id. at 18.
53 Id. at 11.
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session.54 A study on the life of the typical congressman
concludes as follows:
While few Members of Congress expressed
satisfaction with the amount of time they
spend with their families, most accepted
their prioritization of work over personal
life and the extraordinary long hours in
their work week. As noted in this and other
research, this kind of persistent behavior
and attitude in a workforce can have
negative consequences. In a normal job
setting,
this
could
lead
to
underperformance or job burnout. In
Congress, this also could lead to inefficient
legislative processes, poorer constituent
services,
and
ineffective
public
55
policymaking.
Increasing the size of Congress would enable more
congressmen to serve sparsely populated, hard to reach
states in the West. For example, Wyoming is currently
represented by one representative because its population
is low and the current apportionment formula provides,56
in effect, for one representative for every 750,000
inhabitants.57 Were my proposal adopted, Wyoming’s
Id at 6, 18.
Id. at 37.
56 For how apportionment is calculated, see Congressional
Apportionment: Computing Apportionment, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.census.gov/population
/apportionment/about/computing.html [https://perma.cc/WZ
F5-49VW].
57 See Stephen Caruso, 750,000-to-1: The Ratio at the Heart
of America’s Electoral Issues, PITT NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://pittnews.com/article/65712/opinions/750000-to-1-the54
55
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congressional representation in the House would triple,
which would enable its congressional delegation to
effectively share the burden of constituency service in a
large state that is difficult to access by commercial flight
from Washington.58 It would also concomitantly reduce
fundraising demands for each representative and make
time available for other aspects of the job including
legislative drafting, public policy specialization,
administrative oversight and committee work.59 While
Congress cannot possibly be expected to match the
staffing or expertise of specialists within administrative
agencies, Congress is needlessly hamstrung by the lack
of available personnel.
IV. Change from Single Member Plurality
Districting to Proportional Representation
Single-member plurality districting worsens this
problem. Paradigmatic in much of the English-speaking
world, single-member plurality districts have the
advantage of simplicity and historical pedigree. They
also engender a proximity between legislators and their
constituents because each representative is responsible
ratio-at-the-heart-of-americas-electoral-issues/ (stating that
“the average congressman represents 733, 104 citizens”)
[https://perma.cc/EAD3-WURJ].
58 Flights to Wyoming from Washington, D.C. typically
require two or more transfers at hub airports.
59 E.g. Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress
Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 8, 2013),https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.h
tml (the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
advises freshman congressmen to spend at least 4 hours each
day “cold-calling” potential donors to solicit re-election
funds.) [https://perma.cc/4TGE-2QXJ].
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for a defined geographical space.60 The U.S. Constitution
does not require single-member plurality districting.
Article I, Section 2 provides that the “House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second Year by the People of the several States,
and the Electors in each State shall have the
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous branch of the State Legislature” and Article I,
Section 4 provides “[T]he manner of elections are to be
determined by the State legislature.”61 Congress, for the
first time, required single-member plurality districting
via the Apportionment Act of 1842,62 which set House
membership at 223 and contained a requirement of
single-member districts.63 The only requirement of
single-member districts was, at the time, seen as an
improvement over at-large districts, because at-large
districts
deprived
minority
perspectives
from
representation, and proportional representation was first
introduced
in
mid-19th
century
Denmark.64
This is because single member plurality districts provide
constituents with one directly elected Representatives in a
defined geographical area that they can turn to for
constituency services.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
62 See Royce Crocker, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42831,
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2012)
(discussing the provisions of the Act).
63 See Apportionment Legislation 1840-1880, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/reference/app
ortionment/apportionment_legislation_1840_-_1880.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/FJ6J-AGRA].
64 See, e.g., Kenneth E. Miller, The Danish Electoral System,
18 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 71, 71 (1964) (stating that the first
elections in Denmark to feature proportional representation
occurred in 1856); see also Voting Rights Act, § 2, codified
as 52 U.S.C. § 10508 (2012 & Supp. V 2017) (for an example
of how Congress addressed voter assistance); Crocker, supra
60
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Congressional apportionment acts, which historically
followed the decennial census, initially gave states some
leeway to use at-large districts, but Congress, in 1967,
enacted the Uniform Congressional District Act allowing
only for single member plurality districting.65 This
legislation supplemented the 1929 Reapportionment Act,
and was enacted in response to a concern that the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Baker v. Carr,66 Wesberry
v. Sanders,67 and Reynolds v. Sims,68 mandating equally
sized legislative districts based on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as well as the
Voting Rights Act of 1965’s mandate of ending racial
discrimination in franchise rights, could be undermined
by recalcitrant states resorting to the use of at-large
districts as a second-generation voting barrier.69 The
note 63, at 3–5 (detailing the history of congressional
redistricting); Douglas J. Amy, A Brief History of
Proportional Representation in the United States, FAIR VOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/a_brief_history_of_proportional_rep
resentation_in_the_united_states
[https://perma.cc/73UDLSJK].
65 See Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–196, 81 Stat. 581
(providing for single-member apportionment for the House of
Representatives); Congressional Apportionment, HIST., ART
& ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Apportion
ment/Apportionment/ [https://perma.cc/M68R-DU9B].
66 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
67 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)
68 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
69 See Crocker, supra note 63, at 4 (stating that the 1967
legislation was the first legislation since 1929 to address
congressional districting); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 568 (1964) (concluding that legislative districts must be
roughly equal in population to satisfy the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (mandating equal apportionment of
House of Representatives districts); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
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reason at-large districting was, at the time, seen as an
effective means of undermining racial minority suffrage
rights is straightforward. Assume a state is allotted five
representatives and that its population is 60% white and
40% black with complete racial polarization in living
patterns and political preference. Under single member
plurality districting, whites would elect three white
representatives while blacks would elect two. Under an
at-large system, all voters in the state would vote for five
candidates, resulting in white-preferred candidates
winning all five seats, presumable by a 60 to 40 percent
margin.
Unfortunately,
single
member
plurality
districting has become, with advances in technology and
our greater understanding of voting patterns, a means of
distorting election results and depressing voter turnout,
especially in “safe districts.”70 To illustrate the scale of
the problem, according to the Cook Political Report, only
50 of 435 House districts can be characterized as “toss up
or worse” for the incumbent office holder.71 This
186, 237 (1962) (concluding legislative districting is
justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause).
70 See Bernard Grofman & Peter Selb, Turnout and the
(Effective) Number of Parties at the National and District
Levels: A Puzzle-Solving Approach, 17 PARTY POLITICS 93, 94
(2011) (although the authors seek to partially refute this
assertion throughout the article, it is an expectation the
authors highlight).
71 2018 House Race Ratings, COOK POL. REP. (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/187562
[https://perma.cc/7CXY-YXV7]; see also Jasmine C. Lee &
Alexander Burns, 2018 Midterm Elections: House Races to
Watch Right Now, NY TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytim
es.com/interactive/2018/us/elections/house-race-ratings.html
[https://perma.cc/4UUN-LL6L].
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exacerbates partisanship by incentivizing members to
fear partisan primary challengers from their same party
over general election opponents.72 Single member
districting also encourages regionalism to the detriment
of national cohesion by exaggerating regional political
culture differences and blanching the political diversity
found within states and regions.73
Single member districting leads inexorably to
partisan gerrymandering, which is defined as the
creation of Congressional districts that are politically
uncompetitive at general election based on voter
demographics and historical voting patterns.74 It has
See Fred Dews, A Primer on Gerrymandering ad Political
Polarization, BROOKINGS NOW (July 6, 2017), https://www.br
ookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06/a-primer-ongerrymandering-and-political-polarization/
(“[P]artisan
attachments powerfully shape political perceptions, beliefs
and values, and incumbents enjoy advantages well beyond
the way in which their districts are configured.” (emphasis
added)) [https://perma.cc/7MBH-4FXY].
73 Id. (“Most voters have sorted themselves into a party by
their ideological views, and their decisions on where to reside
have promoted a geographical segregation of like-minded
citizens.”).
74 Nina Totenberg, Partisan Gerrymandering: How Much is
Too Much?, NPR (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.npr.org/
2017/10/03/555425809/supreme-court-set-to-considerpartisan-gerrymandering(defining“partisan
gerrymandering” as “the practice of drawing legislative and congressional
district lines to maximize and perpetuate the power of an
incumbent political party.”) [https://perma.cc/T3CS-ZVKD];
see Vieth v. Jubilerer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality
opinion
by
Justice
Scalia
concluding
partisan
gerrymandering claims are per se non-justiciable and
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy that leaves room for
partisan gerrymandering claims to be adjudicated on equal
protection grounds). With Justice Kennedy being replaced by
72
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created a bizarre, quasi-democratic world where
politicians choose which voters they represent.75
Partisan gerrymandering has indeed become exceedingly
problematic and is being used to effectively gutter
minority franchise rights by enabling state legislatures
to hire election experts to create legislative districts that,
in effect, “game the system” to predetermine election
outcomes and dilute the political power of racial minority
voters through the creation of racially and politically
homogeneous constituencies.76 Just this summer, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that partisan
gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable political
questions that are beyond the reach of the federal
courts.77 A concomitant of this process is voter apathy,
brought about due to the “wasted vote” phenomenon
Justice Brett Kavanaugh, my expectation is that partisan
gerrymandering claims will now be treated as nonjusticiable.
75 Wayne Dawkins, In America, Voters Don’t Pick Their
Politicians. Politicians Pick Their Voters, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct
/09/virginia-gerrymandering-voting-rights-act-black-voters
[https://perma.cc/UQ67-4VF7].
76 This is especially so since the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated Voting Rights Act Section 4, which had provided
the coverage formula for determining the jurisdictions
needing to obtain federal preclearance before implementing
voting procedure changes. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529, 557 (2013). See generally M. Akram Faizer,
Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court’s Recent
Decision to Invalidate the Voting Rights Act’s Coverage
Formula Will Exacerbate the Divisions that Bedevil U.S.
Society, 45 CUMB. L. REV. 303, 303, 317 (2014) [hereinafter
Reinforced Polarization].
77 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019)
(two cases that were merged by the Court, concluding
partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions
that are beyond the reach of federal courts).
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within each district. To explain, because there is little to
no chance of a Democrat winning my East Tennessee
Congressional District or the state for U.S. Senate or
Electoral College purposes, many Democraticallyinclined voters in the constituency choose not to vote or
vote in the Republican primary.78 Studies evidence that
geographical polarization, in conjunction with partisan
districting, has created a phenomenon whereby
Democratic congressional candidates would have to win
the nationwide popular vote by at least seven percentage
points to form a majority in the House of
Representatives.79 The inequity of this outcome is
evidenced by the fact the Republicans formed sizeable
majorities after the 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections,
although they won a bare plurality of the national
popular vote.80 Democrats retook the House after the
2018 mid-term elections but needed a popular vote
See Peter Soderlund, Candidate-Centred Electoral Systems
and Voter Turnout, 40 WEST EUR. POL. 516, 517 (2017)
(arguing that empirical evidence proves that voter turnout
decreases when campaigns are “candidate-centered”).
79 Elia Nilsen, A New Report Says Democrats Need to Win the
Popular Vote by 11 Points to Retake the House, VOX (Mar. 27,
2018,
10:30
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/3/27/17144198/gerrymandering-brennan-center
-report-midterms-democrats-house-2018 [https://perma.cc/69
ZW-78MW].
80 See America’s Electoral System Gives the Republicans
Advantages Over Democrats, ECONOMIST (July 12, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/12/americaselectoral-system-gives-the-republicans-advantages-overdemocrats [https://perma.cc/82R4-ZEAP]; see also Molly E.
Reynolds, Republicans in Congress Got a “Seats Bonus” This
Election
(Again),
BROOKINGS
(Nov.
22,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/22/gop-seatsbonus-in-congress/ [https://perma.cc/3EFQ-SVZT].
78
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majority of 8.6% to produce this result.81 This asymmetry
undermines democratic accountability. According to a
detailed study on the negative consequences of plurality
districting:
The chances of any one vote
affecting the outcome are small in all mass
elections. However, in plurality systems
there is noticeably less incentive to vote
because in many places it is obvious who
will win locally. In contrast under
proportional representation it is never
clear who will be allocated the final seat in
any particular district. Meanwhile, across
a country as a whole, the tendency for
plurality rule to manufacture a majority
for the largest party in the legislature
makes ‘landslides’ more likely. It may be
particularly disheartening for those with
little knowledge or interest in politics to
face an uncompetitive election.82
To illustrate, North Carolina, even after the 2018
Democratic wave election, currently has thirteen
Representatives,83 eight of whom are Republicans,
notwithstanding the fact the Governor is a Democrat and
2018 House Popular Vote Tracker, COOK POL. REP. (Jan. 10,
2019), https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/house-charts/
2018-house-popular-vote-tracker [https://perma.cc/PP3U4LVG].
82 Fisher, et al., Disengaging Voters: Do Plurality Systems
Discourage the Less Knowledgeable from Voting?, 27
ELECTORAL STUD. 89, 90–91 (2008).
83
North
Carolina,
GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/conger
ss/members/NC#representatives [https://perma.cc/R4TW-6U
ST].
81
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the aggregate vote count is typically evenly divided
between the major parties.84 This inequitable result
engenders voter apathy85 and distorts North Carolina’s
political culture to the right notwithstanding the fact
voter preferences are more nuanced. The end result is a
relatively monographic representation paradigm that
masks not only North Carolina’s, but the entire southeast
region’s political diversity. The same holds true in more
conservative states. South Carolina, for example,
currently elects seven Representatives, five of whom are
Republican.86 This incorrectly creates a perception that
South Carolina is a politically homogeneous state when,
in reality, more than 40% of South Carolinians voted
Democratic.87 Under a proportional representation
paradigm, where political parties would be awarded
seats based on the proportion of the two-party vote,
Democrats would potentially hold three of South
Carolina’s seven House seats. The reverse would
obviously apply in majority Democratic states such as
California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey.

See Who’s Winning in North Carolina, WASH. POST (Dec. 5,
2018, 12:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/2016election-results/north-carolina/?utm_term=.722d7897bfc3
(https://perma.cc/8G32-D9DC].
85 See Soderlund, supra note 79, at 517 (discussing lower
voter turnout rates in “candidate-centered” elections).
86
South
Carolina,
GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/conger
ss/members/SC#representatives [https://perma.cc/JT2Q-WX
8Z].
87 See Who’s Winning South Carolina, WASH. POST (Nov. 8,
2018, 11:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/2016election-results/south-carolina/?utm_term=.6e3601c59c01
[https://perma.cc/W2G9-FF3Z].
84
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Because of the country’s lamentable correlation
between race and partisanship,88 the districting process
has been used as an effective means of diluting racial
minority voting power as state legislatures “crack” and
“pack” minority voters to predetermine the results of
most House election races.89 Indeed, single member
plurality districting, as applied, is now an effective
“second generation barrier” to voting that nullifies the
Voting Rights Act’s effectiveness after Shelby County v.
Holder invalidated the VRA’s preclearance provision,
which had been its most effective provision.90 Thomas
Edsall writes:
Over the past twelve Presidential elections, African
Americans voted for the Democratic Party candidate by an
average margin of 87% to 13%. Perry Bacon, Jr. & Dhrumil
Mehta, The Diversity of Black Political Views,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 6, 2018, 5:56 AM), https://fivethirtyei
ght.com/features/the-diversity-of-black-political-views
[https://perma.cc/49NS-QKML]. Fifty-four percent of whites
favor the Republican Party. Party Affiliation Among Voters:
1992-2016, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 13, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2016/09/13/2-party-affiliationamong-voters-1992-2016/ [https://perma.cc/YD63-YFTE].
89 “Cracking” involves spreading minority or ideologically
cohesive voters over many districts, while “packing” involves
artificially concentrating these voters into a single district to
reduce their influence in other districts. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
541, 551–53 (2004) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267,
286 n.7 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
90 See Reinforced Polarization, supra note 77, at 306, 326–27.
In Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s coverage
formula for determining the states that needed preclearance
before implementing voting procedure changes. Holder, 570
U.S. at 557. This had been the VRA’s most effective provision
because it required jurisdictions that had a pattern and
88
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Republicans
in
control
of
redistricting have two goals: the defeat of
white Democrats, and the creation of safe
districts for Republicans. They have
achieved both of these goals by increasing
the number of districts likely to elect an
African-American. Black voters are
gerrymandered out of districts represented
by whites of both parties, making the
Democratic incumbent weaker and the
Republican incumbent stronger.91
In short, since the Voting Rights Act’s effective demise,
Republicans nationwide have used the districting process
to effectively dilute Democratic power by making it a
racial minority party.92 Edsall writes:
The long-term importance of
Republican
success
controlling
the
redistricting process is that it provides the
party with a tool to counter the growing
strength of black, Hispanic and AsianAmerican voters. Republican control of
practice of discrimination in the provision of franchise rights
to seek preclearance from either the U.S. Attorney General or
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before
implementing voting procedure changes. With this
preclearance no longer applicable, victims of franchise
discrimination, who typically lack financial resources, must
commence suit at their own expense to police voting rights in
a country with over four thousand voting jurisdictions.
91 Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Decline of Black Power in
the South, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2013, 9:34 PM), https://opini
onator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-decline-of-blackpower-in-the-south/ [https://perma.cc/7ZDR-N9V9].
92 Id.
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Congressional district lines in 2012
allowed the party to maintain a 34-seat
majority in the United States House of
Representatives while winning one million
fewer votes than the Democrats over all.
As the United States moves
inexorably toward becoming a minority
majority country, the Republican Party
needs every available weapon to survive
what it perceives as a siege. The Shelby
County v. Holder decision issued by the
five conservative members of the Supreme
Court gives Republicans even wider
latitude to use the manipulation of district
lines through “bleaching,” “packing” and
“cracking,” in order to maintain its control
over state legislatures. This, in turn,
grants Republicans control of the House of
Representatives.93
Edsall concludes:
Democrats often sound gleeful
about the idea of Republicans’ becoming
the white party. They have successfully
elected and re-elected the nation’s first
black president. But in the South and in
some Northern states, the Republican
takeover of state legislatures has left black
and Hispanic citizens without effective
representation – representation that can
come only from the majority party. The
racialization of the two parties, most
noticeable in the South, will work to keep
93

Id. (emphasis added).
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minority Americans at the margins of
power, hindered from shaping the policies
that determine social and economic
mobility and the overall quality of life.94
The result is that there are currently only five
African American chairs of any congressional committees
or subcommittees in the House of Representatives.95 At
the state level, although the number of African
Americans legislators in the South has increased “from
fewer than five to 313,” nearly all of these elected officials
are Democrats, which, because it is the South’s minority
political party, deprives African Americans of real
political power.96 Single member plurality districting
effectively denies political representation to many
Americans, encourages political cynicism and apathy
within the broader electorate, and exacerbates regional
and political polarization by masking the diversity found
within each state and region.97

Id.
See Black Americans Who Have Chaired Standing
Committees in the U.S. House, 1949-Present, HISTORY, ART &
ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publica
tions/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Chairs-ofCongressional-Committees/ [https://perma.cc/Q6QP-DZTA].
96 Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Decline of Black Power in
the South, NY Times (July 10, 2013, 9:34 PM)
[https://perma.cc/7376-5YXW]
see also Joshua Zingher, Whites Have Fled the Democratic
Party. Here’s How the Nation Got There, Wash. Post (May
22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/05/22/whites-have-fled-the-democratic-partyheres-how-the-nation-got-there/?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.6354a6285815 [https://perma.cc/H8RH-J5TP].
97 Reinforced Polarization, supra note 77, at 315.
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Changing our election framework from a singlemember plurality paradigm to a proportional
representation framework would, in the end,
dramatically increase voter participation rates and
reduce political and racial polarization.98 It would also
reveal the political heterogeneity within states that are
currently perceived to be politically monographic, i.e.
either safely “red” or “blue.” This will result in better,
more bipartisan lawmaking and administrative
oversight by legislators who are incentivized to focus on
the public interest as opposed to the parochial and
partisan.
V. Increasing the Size of the House of
Representatives and Changing to Proportional
Representation Will Facilitate Administrative
Oversight
Much of the instability in administrative law
stems from a crabbed reading of the Constitution and the
federal courts’ refusal to countenance innovative means
of holding administrative agencies accountable.99
Although administrative agencies’ consistent pattern of
enacting legislative rules based on broad congressional
delegations, is partially necessitated by the inherent
difficulty of legislating for a continent-sized market
economy that is subject to rapid technological changes, it
must also be recognized that legislative immobility and
the lack of legislative guidance to agencies is facilitated
by an institutionally understaffed and hyper-polarized

See id. at 326–27.
See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956 (1983)
(precluding use of the legislative veto to hold administrative
agencies to account on separation of powers grounds).
98
99
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legislative branch.100 A better resourced and more
cohesive Congress will more effectively write legislation
that provides guidance to agencies and hold them to
account by way of administrative oversight, i.e. by
providing Congress with greater resources, agencies will,
in the end, be more responsive and accountable.
It is a paradox of American history that before the
Executive Branch grew geometrically as a result of the
Progressive Era and New Deal, membership in the House
of Representatives was artificially capped at 435.101 This
limitation has become malignant over time, especially
when conjoined with the baneful effects of single-member
plurality districting. Increasing the number of
representatives and changing our method of electing
legislators to proportional representation will increase
legislative effectiveness and therefore decrease the
likelihood of administrative overreach. 102
Congress’s attempts to hold agencies to account via
legislative innovations have been ineffective. In INS v.
Chadha,103 the Supreme Court, citing an ostensible
separation of powers transgression by the legislative
branch, invalidated Congress’s use of a unicameral
legislative veto to nullify an administrative action by
majority vote. The Congressional Review Act (CRA) 104
was enacted in 1996 and requires agencies to submit all

See generally Congress’s Authority to Influence and
Control Executive Branch Agencies, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45442
[https://perma.cc/Q3VN-VXP5].
101 See generally Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46
Stat. 21, 2 U.S.C. § 2a.
102 See Reinforced Polarization, supra note 77, at 350.
103 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
104 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012).
100
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major regulations to Congress before implementation.105
The evidence, though, demonstrates that agency
behavior has been unaffected by the CRA.106 To
demonstrate why, Congress, under the CRA, has only 60
legislative days to pass a joint resolution of disapproval
to keep a particular regulation from going into effect.107
This is a manifestly illegitimate and unworkable
paradigm, largely because the congressional coalition
that enacted the original legislation may not be in place
to disapprove of an illegitimate final rulemaking. It is
also entirely infeasible for Congress to review all 4,000
plus annual rulemakings to effectively preclude
administrative overreach.108 Between 1996 and 2008,
federal agencies submitted nearly 48,000 final rules for
Congressional review, and a mere 47 joint resolutions of
disapproval, regarding 35 rules, were introduced.109 “A
grand total of one regulation has been disapproved,” and
this was the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s “ergonomics rule,” which was “finalized
at the end of the Clinton Administration” and jointly
disapproved by both Houses of the subsequent Congress

Id. § 801. Major regulations are those with an annual
impact of at least $100 million to the U.S. economy. Id. § 804.
106 Id. (quoting Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong,
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write law and Make
Policy 141 (3d ed. 2003)).
107 Id. § 801
108 See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., How Many Rules and
Regulations Do Federal Agencies Issue?, FORBES (Aug. 15,
2017, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/
2017/08/15/how-many-rules-and-regulations-do-federalagencies-issue/#7e8ac24c1e64
[https://perma.cc/QYN6-JU
5F]. By contrast, Congress typically enacts only 250 or so
pieces of legislation on an annual basis.
109 BREYER, ET AL., supra note 14, at 84.
105
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and an incoming President of a different political party,
namely George W. Bush.110.
Requiring joint resolutions of approval such as the
proposed Regulations from the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny (REINS) Act111 is similarly unworkable. Unlike
the CRA which requires joint disapproval of a proposed
major regulation112, REINS would reverse this
presumption and instead require joint bicameral
approval of all proposed rulemakings prior to
finalization.113 The problem, once again, is that Congress
would be overwhelmed by the task of approving 4,000 or
so annual rulemakings,114 thereby creating a bottleneck
to preclude agencies from timely action. Rather than
implement novel and infeasible means of holding
agencies to account, increasing the number of and
improving the method of electing representatives will
free resources to facilitate administrative oversight in
three ways. First, it would enhance congressional
resources to properly draft and enact legislation with
proper instruction given to adequately guide agencies as
they undertake the rulemaking process. Second, a better
staffed and less partisan Congress will better oversee
agencies to deter overreach. Finally, it increases the
likelihood of Congress enacting, amending, or repealing
legislation as needed. This would take pressure off
agencies to, in effect, “fill” the legislative void by way of
agency rulemakings and guidance memos that, at their
Id.
See BREYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 85. Regulations from
the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 10, 112th Cong.
(2011).
112 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012).
113 H.R. 10.
114 See Crews, Jr., supra note 109 (internal citations omitted)
(the “Public Laws vs Agency Rules by Category” chart shows
the number of rules adopted per year).
110
111
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core, test separation of powers principles and erode trust
in government. Two examples of congressional paralysis
leading to administrative overreach are Congress’s: 1)
failure to adequately draft the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA),115 which has resulted
in perceived administrative overreach; and 2) failure to
reach a bipartisan compromise on immigration, which
precipitated President Obama’s Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Executive Order.116
With respect to the ACA, a Democratic Congress
drafted and enacted the legislation without any
Republican support in the House of Representatives
which, at the time, had lopsided 257-199 Democratic
majority.117 This margin was largely because of the 2006
and 2008 “wave” elections that were based on, among
other things, public disapproval of the Bush
Administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina, its
handling of the Iraq and Afghan wars and the Financial
Crisis that followed Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in
September 2008. Unfortunately, these wave elections
came at the expense of moderate Republicans who might
have cooperated with Democrats to enact an effective
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148., 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
116 Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children, U.S. DEPT. HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercisingprosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-aschildren.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZR3-HA5K].
117 Gary Price & Tim Norbeck, A Look Back at How the
President was Able to Sign Obamacare Into Law Four Years
Ago, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.forb
es.com/sites/physiciansfoundation/2014/03/26/a-look-backat-how-the-president-was-able-to-sign-obamacare-into-lawfour-years-ago/#113dd648526b [https://perma.cc/MLA3-CU
DU].
115
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health care compromise because bipartisan-inclined
moderates in “swing” districts lost their reelection
bids.118 Eventually, 219 Representatives voted for the
ACA, while 212 voted against, with no Republicans
voting for the measure.119 This, along with the fact the
law was enacted via reconciliation to avoid a Senate
filibuster,120 created a perception that the ACA was a
hyper-partisan piece of social welfare legislation that
was, to paraphrase a Republican talking point, “shoved
down the throats” of the American public.121 Notice,
however, that if a larger House had been elected via
proportional representation, many more moderate
Republicans would have been elected after the 2006 and
2008 elections to constructively cooperate with
Democrats to arrive at a more nuanced, bipartisan and
less mistake-prone piece of legislation. Two obvious
errors are worthy of mention. First, Speaker Pelosi, her
caucus, and the Obama Administration never
anticipated states would refuse to cooperate with federal
officials in effectuating the Medicaid expansion122
See Bradley Jones, House Republicans Who Lost their
Reelection Bids were More Moderate than Those Who Won,
PEW RES. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/12/07/house-republicans-who-lost-re-electionbids-were-more-moderate-than-those-who-won/
[https://perma.cc/J5QT-BB8T].
119 Shailagh Murrary & Lori Montgomery, House Passes
Health-Care Reform Bill Without Republican Votes, WASH.
POST (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/21/AR2010032100943.html
[https://perma.cc/RP8E-KPMX].
120 Id.
121 See Price & Norbeck, supra note 118.
122 See Mark Hall, Do States Regret Expanding Medicaid?,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2018/03/26/do118
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because it was almost entirely paid for by the federal
government.123 As such,
neither congressional
Democrats, nor the Obama White House, anticipated
that the provision requiring states to expand their
Medicaid rolls to cover all individuals whose incomes are
below 138% of federal poverty guidelines would be: a)
objected to by state attorneys general in “red” leaning
states; and b) eventually found, by the U.S. Supreme
Court, to be improperly coercive of state sovereignty as
confirmed
by
the
U.S.
Constitution’s Tenth
Amendment.124 The Supreme Court’s decision to remedy
this defect by allowing recalcitrant states to opt-out of the
Medicaid expansion while leaving the rest of the law
intact, led most “red state” legislatures to refuse federal
funding to expand their Medicaid programs due to
political polarization on the issue.125 This, in turn,
created an adverse selection phenomenon in the ACA’s
healthcare exchanges that caused insurance companies
to cease participation and exit the insurance
marketplaces or dramatically raise premiums because
high-risk, low-income individuals that the ACA’s framers
states-regret-expanding-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/F7XFFU2F].
123 See 42 U.S.C. §. 1396(c) (2012), invalidated by Nat’l Fed.
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See generally
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148., 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
124 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 580–81; see also ACA Frequently
Asked Questions, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, https://www.apha.
org/topics-and-issues/health-reform/aca-frequently-askedquestions (discussing the efforts to increase the new
minimum to 138%) [https://perma.cc/6C8Q-4MQZ].
125 See id. at 585–86. As of November 2018, 14 states had not
expanded their Medicaid programs. Infographic: A 50-State
Look at Medicaid Expansion, FAMILIESUSA (Nov. 2018),
https://familiesusa.org/product/50-state-look-medicaidexpansion [https://perma.cc/6UMC-D2DF].
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anticipated would be covered by the Medicaid expansion,
instead sought coverage under the exchanges.126
The ACA also was mistakenly drafted such that it
textually authorized tax credits to be provided for
insurance plans purchased “through an Exchange
established by the State” when Congress’s intent was to
authorize tax credits for policies purchased on both state
and federal exchanges.127 When petitioners-taxpayers
subsequently challenged an IRS Rule that authorized the
provision of tax credits for policies purchased on both
exchanges, the Supreme Court, in King v. Burwell,128
concluded that the term “Exchange established by the
State” was sufficiently ambiguous to merit the IRS
granting tax credits for insurance policies purchased on
both the federal and state exchanges because doing
otherwise would lead to a “death spiral” in the insurance
marketplaces that is inconsistent with Congress’s intent
under the ACA to provide universal health care
coverage.129 It is noteworthy, however, that the Chief
Justice set forth the following indictment of the ACA’s
drafters:
The Affordable Care Act contains
more than a few
examples of inartful drafting . . . Several
features of the Act's passage contributed to
that unfortunate reality. Congress wrote
key parts of the Act behind closed doors,
See Olga Khazan, Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving
Obamacare: How Rejecting Medicaid and Other Government
Decisions Have Hurt Insurance Markets, ATLANTIC (May 11,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/05/w
hy-so-many-insurers-are-leaving-obamacare/526137/ [https:/
/perma.cc/5QUU-KNEV].
127 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a) (2012).
128 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
129 Id. at 2482–83.
126
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rather than through the “traditional
legislative process.” And Congress passed
much of the Act using a complicated
budgetary
procedure
known
as
“reconciliation,”
which
limited
opportunities for debate and amendment,
and bypassed the Senate's normal 60–vote
filibuster requirement. As a result, the Act
does not reflect the type of care and
deliberation that one might expect of such
significant legislation.130
The response to the Court’s decision to uphold the
IRS Rule was widespread conservative hostility to the
Chief Justice, who was accused of illegitimately
protecting the ACA.131 It also, once again, raised the issue
of administrative overreach and the illegitimacy of
judicial agency deference doctrines.132
The ACA is a paradigmatic example of the
difficulties in passing well-drafted social welfare
Id. at 2492 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
See Stephen Dinan, Roberts Saves Obamacare for 2nd
Time: Scalia Chides: “Words Have No Meaning,” WASH.
TIMES
(June
25,
2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 2015/jun/25/chiefjustice-roberts-saves-obamacare-second-time/
[https://perma.cc/CCJ2-KNKV]. See generally Sarah Kliff,
Chevron Deference: The Legal Principle that Could Save
Obamacare, VOX (June 20, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.vox.
com/2015/6/20/8815097/king-v-burwell-chevron-deference
(explaining Chevron Deference and its application to the
ACA) [https://perma.cc/ZC6F-RN9L].
132 See Jonathan Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Halbig and
King: A Simple Case of IRS Overreach, HEALTHAFFAIRS (May
22,
2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140
522.039151/full/ [https://perma.cc/D46X-9BGA].
130
131
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legislation in a hyper-polarized Congress. Notice,
however, that had there been more representatives
elected via proportional representation, the first
casualties of the Democratic 2006 and 2008 “wave”
elections would not have been the moderate Republicans
who would have been feasible partners in a healthcare
compromise. The Democratic leadership would also have
been less partisan and more inclined to work with
Republican moderates to craft a bipartisan, and less
error-prone piece of legislation. Finally, the legislation
would have benefitted from more members available for
both drafting and review purposes. Were this to have
been the case, the issue of administrative overreach may
never have arisen.
Another paradigmatic example of administrative
overreach by Executive Order is DACA, which purported
to defer deportation and grant work authorization to
unauthorized migrants who were brought to the U.S. as
minors.133 Recognizing that the immigration laws
nowhere authorize the use of Executive Orders to either
defer deportation to an entire group of illegal migrants or
grant work authorization and other U.S. lawful presence
benefits to these same individuals, it must be
remembered that mass unauthorized migration to the
U.S. stems from the development of an international
migration route from Central America to the U.S.
Southwest that was largely non-existent when the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was enacted.134
DACA was issued only after Congress had failed to act on
the perceived problem of illegal migration for more than
a generation and, most recently, after the House of
Representatives repeatedly failed to act on a bipartisan
Napolitano, supra note 117.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
79 Stat. 911 (1965).
133
134
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Senate “Gang of Eight” compromise that would have
provided permanent residency and an earned pathway to
citizenship for certain unauthorized migrants.135 The
House’s failure to act was largely a concomitant of
districting-facilitated political polarization that has led
House Republicans to effectively veto necessary
immigration compromises that were proposed during
both the second Bush and Obama Administrations.136 Of
course, partisanship also explains why congressional
Democrats have systematically refused to support
measures to either enhance border security or expand a
temporary guest worker program.137
An immigration compromise, such as the one
proposed by the Senate Gang of Eight,138 might have
For examples of proposed immigration reform from the
Senate, see Key Provisions in “Gang of Eight” Senate
Proposal, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.washingt
onpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/senators-immigrationlegislation-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/XK5D-3Y6G]; see
David Nakamura, Senators to Release Immigration Plan,
Including a Path to Citizenship, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senators-to-release
-immigration-plan-including-a-path-to-citizenship/2013/04/
15/67914cee-a5e2-11e2-8302-3c7e0ea97057_story.html?
utm_term=.0d1a336806d4 [https://perma.cc/9D8X-LKYH].
136 Why Immigration Reform Died in Congress, NBC NEWS
(July 1, 2014, 9:09 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
first-read/why-immigration-reform-died-congress-n145276
[https://perma.cc/57CL-ZXNC].
137 See Peter Beinart, How the Democrats Lost Their Way on
Immigration, ATLANTIC (Jul./Aug. 2017), https://www.theat
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/07/the-democratsimmigration-mistake/528678/ (discussing the shift in the
Democrat perspective of immigration)[https://perma.cc/VD6
9-8N89].
138 See Key Provisions in “Gang of Eight” Senate Proposal,
supra note 137.
135
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been feasible were there to have been a larger, less
partisan House of Representatives that was elected in a
manner to protect, as opposed to, undermine moderates.
Such a compromise would have, of course, preempted
DACA, any discussion of administrative overreach on the
immigration issue, and prevented the current “crisis” at
the U.S.-Mexico border that, according to President
Trump and his supporters, requires the construction of a
massive 2,000 mile long border wall.139
VI. Conclusion
My proposal is twofold. First, the House of
Representatives should increase in size from 435 to 1,250
members such that each state will have a minimum of
three Representatives. Second, House Members should
be elected via a proportional representation paradigm.
This will, over time, lead to a more effective, less
polarized, and more effective legislative branch that has
sufficient staffing and incentive to enact needed
bipartisan legislation and more effectively oversee
administrative agencies and the rulemaking process. It
will also reduce the chaos to engender a more cohesive
and better governed nation.

139 See Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, Trump Wall – All You
Need to Know About the US Border Wall in Seven Charts,
BBC NEWS (June 26, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-46824649 [https://perma.cc/ZQ5M-WU4L].
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